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OUR MOHAMMEDAN SUBJECTS.

AT the date of President Roosevelt's "amnesty" proclamation of July 4, 1902, the only inhabitants of the Philippine Islands who were in revolt, and to whom that proclamation did not apply, were the Moros. The President declared that the Moros had not yet "submitted to the authority of the United States." These are the people who were supposed to have been brought peaceably under American authority by the agreement made with the Sultan of Sulu in 1899. Hostilities between their chiefs and the forces of the United States began in the spring of 1902.

Some six weeks after the President's proclamation, on August 18, 1902, it was reported from Constantinople that "the non-execution by the Turkish government of agreements reached long ago on several questions affecting the interests of American citizens" had "led to somewhat strained relations between the United States Legation and the Porte"; and that Minister Leishman had informed the Porte that he would not discuss "other matters" until the terms of the settlements already agreed to had been carried out. On the same day it was cabled from Manila that the Moros in Mindanao were renewing their attacks upon the outposts and pack trains of the American column at Lake Lanao; that the commanders of the American forces in Mindanao had reported "that aggressive action against the Moros" was necessary; and that they asked "permission to move against Bacolod and other strongholds of the hostile Mohammedans." In addition, a press dispatch from Washington reported the approval by General Chaffee of these requests. For the Moros rejected all friendly overtures made to them by the commander of our forces, and renewed the attacks upon American soldiers which had been made from time to time since the preceding May. Neither the expeditions sent against the various sultans of the archipelago nor the continuous defeat that the Moros suffered at our hands seemed to have any effect in reconciling them to our rule; and

though the vigorous measures taken by Captain Pershing were apparently crowned with success, the insurrection broke out again in 1903.

The New York *Times*, in a minor editorial of October 29, 1902, said:

The Moros have no known grievances against the Americans. No attempts have been made to change their customs or to decrease their liberties, and the consideration shown them in these respects was so great as to excite the criticism even of the anti-imperialists. . . . There is something of a mystery in their present misbehavior, for they began well enough, and for a considerable period made no trouble for the few Americans sent among them. This hints at lack of tact somewhere, and the hint might be worth following up.

Now, in the same journal, in its issue of April 22, 1902, we read:

The early "pacification" of Mindanao was at the time attributed to the skill of General Bates, our pioneer in the island. . . . There is no question about the efficient discharge by General Bates of the duties which fell to him. But the conciliatory manner in which he was met was probably as great a surprise to himself as to anybody else. It was to the skill with which an appeal was made to the Sultan of Turkey, in his character of the Mohammedan pope, and to the action which, through the Sheik ul Islam, he was induced to take, that we really owe the spirit of hospitality in which we were received.

And again, on May 6, 1902, an editorial refers to the "clever diplomacy through which the Sultan of Turkey was induced to interest himself in our behalf, to the extent of assuring his co-religionists in the Philippines that the United States did not share the proselytizing tendencies or methods of Spain."

It is a question — the whole situation in Turkey at that time being taken into account — whether the government of the United States is to be congratulated upon this way of attaining its object — upon the "skill with which an appeal was made to the Sultan," or upon the "clever diplomacy" through which he was "induced to interest himself in our behalf." The conditional agreement between the Sultan of Sulu (Jolo) and the United States was negotiated by our commander, General Bates, during the summer

of 1899.¹ The principal features of this agreement were as follows: American sovereignty over the Moros to be recognized; no persecution on account of religion to be allowed; the United States to occupy and control such parts of the archipelago as public interest should demand; all persons to have the right to "purchase land with the sultan's consent"; the introduction of firearms to be prohibited; piracy to be suppressed; the American courts to have jurisdiction except as between the Moros; and the sultan's subsidy from Spain to be continued.

The fact that President McKinley, in his message at the opening of the first session of the Fifty-sixth Congress (December, 1899), in referring quite at length to Turkey, made no mention of the Philippines or of the "friendly offices" of the Turkish Sultan, might seem remarkable were it not for the fact that the agreement with the Sultan of Sulu was not submitted to the Senate until December 18. What is really remarkable, however, is that we should have availed ourselves of the interposition of the "Mohammedan pope," at a moment when our relations with the Sublime Porte were so unsatisfactory. It was only fifteen days later that our minister at Constantinople, Mr. Oscar Straus, left that city, *en route* for Washington, "for consultation" with the United States government as to the state of affairs in Turkey; and as late as June 18 of the following year, he was still "on leave," apparently delaying his return to his post until satisfaction should have been given to our demands. Mr. Straus, in fact, remained away until his successor, Mr. Leishman, was appointed.

In his message of December, 1899, President McKinley said:

In the Turkish Empire the situation of our citizens remains unsatisfactory. Our efforts during nearly forty years to bring about a convention of naturalization seem to be on the brink of final failure through the announced policy of the Ottoman Porte to refuse recognition of the alien status of native Turkish subjects naturalized abroad since 1867.

Our statutes, the President added, do not allow our government "to admit any distinction between the treatment of native and

¹ The agreement was signed August 10, but was not submitted to the United States Senate until the following December, its text being made public December 18.

naturalized Americans abroad." This causes "ceaseless controversy" in cases where "persons owing in the eye of international law a dual allegiance are prevented from entering Turkey or are expelled after entrance." "Our law, in this regard," the President mildly remarked, "contrasts with that of the European States"; the British, for example, not claiming "effect for the naturalization of an alien in the event of his return to his native country, unless the change be recognized by the law of that country or stipulated by treaty between it and the naturalizing state." Other questions pending at the time were those as to extra-territorial jurisdiction in Turkey, claimed by the United States government under the treaty made in 1830; claims for property of American missionaries at Harput, Asia Minor, destroyed at the time of the Armenian massacre in 1895; and a claim for indemnity for the murder of Frank Lenz, on the Turkish frontier, in 1894.

During the summer preceding this message of the President, the efforts of our envoy, Mr. Straus, to secure an interview with the Sultan, at which the settlement of these various claims could be urged upon him, had been unremitting. The difficulties which he encountered were not flattering to our national pride. From a perusal of the volume of *Foreign Relations* for that year, it will be seen that, for a considerable time, Mr. Straus's efforts remained without result. After much shuffling and delay, the Sultan sent word through his chamberlain that a day would be appointed for an audience; that his object had been to arrange the matter of claims in advance, in order that the interview might be pleasant; and that, with this object in view, he had directed the minister for foreign affairs "to reply to Mr. Straus, so that at the audience the question of claims need not be brought up." When at last — but not before September 22 — Mr. Straus was received in audience by the Sultan, the latter, in the course of the interview, referred to the *iradé* for the purchase of a warship, saying that with the making of the contract the American claims would be "wiped out," "and that he would request me not to discuss with him this matter further, as it is arranged for." This strong hint from the Sultan apparently had its effect:

I did not directly go further into the subject [Mr. Straus continues] but asked what answer I should give my government as to when these claims would be "wiped out," and when the *iradé* for the rebuilding of the Harput school buildings would be given. He replied, "as soon as the contract for the ship was concluded, which would be done shortly, just as the minister for foreign affairs had stated to me."

Mr. Straus was also told by the Sultan that

immediately following my audience with him . . . he telegraphed to Mecca, it being the time of the annual pilgrimage, his wishes that the Moslems in the Philippines should not war with the Americans, nor side with the insurgents, but should be friendly with our army, and that, as I assured him, the Americans would not interfere with their religion and would be as tolerant toward them as he was toward the Christians in his empire. . . . He added that there was at Mecca, at the time he sent that message, quite a number of pilgrims from the Pacific islands, and especially their most prominent general and several other officers, and shortly thereafter they returned to their homes. That he was glad that there had been no conflict between our army and the Moslems, and that he certainly hoped their religion would in no manner be interfered with.

Mr. Straus replied that of this the Sultan could certainly feel satisfied; that religious liberty was the chief cornerstone of our political institutions.

According to the Mohammedan religion and the injunctions of the Koran, the annual pilgrimage to Mecca, here referred to, must be made at the appointed season, which is during the months *Shawwal* and *Dulkaada* and the first ten days of the month *Dulheggia*; and this period, during the year 1899, began February 12 and ended April 21. As the evacuation of the Sulu group by the Spanish forces was accomplished on May 19, and the return of General Bates from Sulu, "after having successfully accomplished his mission there," occurred in August, the connection is not difficult to perceive: the path had been smoothed for us through the kind offices of the Turkish Sultan.

With regard to the final payment of our claims, then outstanding, Mr. Straus suggested, in his communications to the Department of State, "tactful pressure"; and he deprecated any show

of force, as being undesirable. Three months later, despite all that had been promised, and despite — or perhaps in consequence of — the complaisance shown by our government, the American demands were still unsatisfied; and, in a note to Tewfik Pasha, dated December 16, 1899, Mr. Straus writes: "Our interpreter was officially informed by the Sublime Porte [apropos of the Harput outrages] that his Majesty would not consent to the rebuilding, as the American missionaries were the cause of the Armenian troubles." And, in a dispatch to the American secretary of state, four days later, he says that

the belief, held to for some years, that our missionaries were at the bottom of the Armenian troubles, or at any rate indirectly connected with the unrest that brought about the troubles, has rendered my task an exceptionally difficult one. I have again and again argued the matter to disabuse the Sultan's mind of this belief; I have again and again cautioned the missionaries to guard against giving color to this suspicion; and I have perhaps not argued in vain, as the Sultan's secretary and the grand vizier have shifted their ground, and now say they do not claim the American-born missionaries are guilty of hostility, nor that our government would permit them to act in a spirit of hostility to Turkey, but that our missionaries have in their employ many Armenian teachers who plot against Turkey.

It was at this point in the negotiations that Mr. Straus left Constantinople; and at the end of the year 1900, he was still in America. In December, 1900, Mr. Griscom, chargé d'affaires, cabled a request that arrangements be made for the battleship "Kentucky" (then in Turkish waters) to remain a little longer, in order that any impression of hostility occasioned by its presence might be removed. The "Kentucky" having been ordered by the Navy Department to remain, Mr. Griscom wrote that on December 10 he had attended a dinner at Yildiz Palace, accompanied by Captain Chester of the "Kentucky" and his staff; that he presented these gentlemen to His Majesty in audience before the dinner, and that after it Captain Chester and he were received in a "long private audience." Mr. Griscom says that there was no mention, during this conversation, of the diplomatic affairs then pending between Turkey and the United States, except that

the Sultan said he had purchased a cruiser from the Messrs. Cramp, of Philadelphia.

It was apparent that he regarded our questions as absolutely settled, and his evident desire was to convey this impression without using any direct expressions. . . . The dinner was a very direct compliment to the United States, as no other foreigners were invited, and necessarily I was placed at His Majesty's left hand, and at his right hand was the grand vizier and then Captain Chester.

It is plain that the Sultan, besides knowing how to make meaningless promises, thoroughly understands the art of entertaining; and that our representative — as has happened before under similar circumstances — did not prove insensible to the influence of attentions the more *empressés* in that they were, on this occasion, largely due to the presence of one of our most powerful warships. Yet can it be held that the tone adopted by the Sultan both toward Mr. Straus in September, 1899, and toward Mr. Griscom in December, 1900 — being virtually a warning not to touch upon certain disagreeable subjects — is one that could safely be taken where the envoys of other great powers were concerned? Is it to be inferred — taking also into account the fact that we send only a minister plenipotentiary, and not an ambassador, to represent us at Constantinople — that we are not yet, in the eyes of the Sultan and his ministers, a nation of the first importance; that we are still, in ever so slight a degree, *une quantité négligeable*?

In obedience to instructions received, during the winter of 1900-1901, from the Department of State, urgent representations were made to the Turkish government; and owing to these, and, possibly, to a wholesome fear of another and more positive naval "demonstration" on our part, Mr. Leishman (who in the meantime had succeeded Mr. Straus) was enabled, on June 12, 1901, to announce, in a telegram, that our claims had been settled; that the sum of nineteen thousand pounds sterling had been deposited to his credit in the Imperial Ottoman Bank; and that this sum was held subject to instructions from the department. The sending of the warship and the intimation of further measures in case of contumacy had borne fruit, as with France a few months later.

The Porte's *non possumus* gave way, as it always does, to the only argument it recognizes, that of *force majeure* — under silent protest, no doubt. But this very fact, that the Turkish government was obliged to yield, where it was felt, rightly or wrongly, that we were under obligations to the head of Islam, may partly account for developments during the summer of 1902. Thus, we find complaints made to the State Department, during the month of August, of "friction" between our minister and the grand vizier (the personal representative of the Sultan), who by his action in declining, on four successive occasions, to receive Mr. Leishman when he called to adjust certain existing difficulties, had rendered inoperative the orders previously issued for their settlement by Tewfik Pasha, minister for foreign affairs.

The principal difficulties here referred to were: obstacles thrown in the way of one of the great American insurance companies, as a result of which its agents were hampered in the transaction of their business in the Turkish dominions; the failure to surrender policies of the same company which had been seized by the Turkish authorities; the question of the emigration of the wives and minor children of naturalized American citizens who were of Ottoman origin; stopping the completion of American mission buildings at Harput, for which official permits had been granted — all of which "the minister for foreign affairs notified Mr. Leishman had been settled, and orders issued putting them into execution." Besides these, there were, from time to time, cases of the non-recognition by the Imperial Ottoman government of claims to American citizenship, made by natives of the Turkish Empire returning there after being naturalized in America. These were the "strained relations" referred to at the beginning of this article as being coincident with the renewal of attacks by the Moros upon our forces stationed in Mindanao.

The favorable action taken by the minister for foreign affairs, on subjects under discussion, having thus been countermanded or annulled by the grand vizier — who, in repeatedly declining to see Mr. Leishman, had refused "a courtesy which is always extended to even the dragomans of the embassies" — Mr. Leishman finally demanded of the Turkish pasha an audience with the Sultan, and requested him, at the same time, to make known to

His Majesty the nature of the business. He also requested of our State Department that "unless the audience with the Sultan were granted, and not only the questions at issue but the principles involved in them satisfactorily settled, he be given permission to demand his passports." As a result, the Sultan, on August 11, gave expression, through his private secretary, to a wish that Mr. Leishman would overlook the discourtesy shown him, on the ground that the grand vizier was "an old man and not feeling well," and call on him on the following day. Mr. Leishman was at first inclined to refuse positively to comply with this request "on the ground that, although such a course might perhaps result in the settlement of some of the immediate questions at issue, it would, under present conditions, neither be compatible with the dignity of the government of the United States, nor settle the important principles involved"; but, upon a suggestion from the department, he cabled, August 21, that, since "His Imperial Majesty had sent the most emphatic instructions to the grand vizier to receive Mr. Leishman at all times in a manner befitting the dignity of the representative of a great power," he had consented to resume ordinary relations. Nevertheless, he regrets that, having been forced to assume a strong position, "the settlement was not based upon broader principles," but states that "the action taken will undoubtedly have a good effect."

It may be said, in passing, that our representatives abroad are possibly in a better position than the Department of State to judge of the amount and quality of courtesy and consideration shown them by foreign governments, and the consequent effect upon the people among whom they are sojourning; certainly in a better position than the mass of our own people, who are apt to regard as of little account the unpleasant predicaments in which our ministers and consuls sometimes find themselves. The American public takes it for granted that, in the long run, we shall get what we want; that "our money will talk," even if the dignity of the Republic suffers in the mean time.

A dispatch from Vienna to the *London Times*, which was cabled to the *New York Times* and appeared in its issue of September 5, 1901, says, apropos of the French government's action in its dispute with Turkey: "Powers having Mohammedan sub-

jects are pleased with the vigorous course France has taken. They believe that the rupture of diplomatic relations between France and Turkey will serve as a warning." Now Professor Vambery,¹ alluding to "the attitude assumed by the Liberal ministry against Turkey," asserts that Turkey is the "only power in the world which can be of great service to England's standing in Asia," and that "cordial relations" with this power "offer the best safeguard to English power in Mohammedan India." It is undoubtedly desirable that the United States, like other powers having Mohammedan subjects, should be able to count upon the Sultan's influence for good with his co-religionists, and it was particularly desirable that we should be "received in a spirit of hospitality" by the Moros and be able to avoid "any trouble whatever in the southern island"; but after having secured this influence, it is at least awkward to be obliged to bring pressure to bear upon the Sultan, and to resort finally to a show of force in order to obtain satisfaction.

As regards the probability of the assimilation of our new colonials in the island of Mindanao and the Sulu archipelago, Professor Vambery, in speaking of the "gigantic work" of the "British civilizers," and in referring to the chances of an Indian uprising, says that

of the two chief elements in India, the Brahminic and the Moslem, the former offers less resistance and proves much more amenable to civilizing influences than the Mohammedan. In spite of the merciless rigor of the system of castes and the ritualistic laws, according to which no Vishnu-worshipper is permitted to come into direct contact with a Christian, or even to allow the shadow of one to fall upon him, the number of Hindostanees of Brahminic faith educated in English schools and employed in the British service by far exceeds the number of Moslem Hindoos similarly educated and employed. . . . Let us own it frankly. Islam has manifested this feature in its struggle with Occidental culture, in all the continent alike, throughout the whole length and breadth of its extent. . . . It is, and remains, the old and incorrigible representative of Asiatic fanaticism, which will enter into no compromises with the modern march of the world.

¹ *The Coming Struggle for India*, p. 139. See also pp. 140, 141.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 151-153.

And Mrs. Stanley Lane-Poole,¹ an experienced observer of Turkish customs and character, says:

The Koran has no conception of the possibility of Christian subjects enjoying the same rights as their Moslem neighbors. No judge, therefore, likes to go against this spirit; and no good Mohammedan can ever bring himself to a level with a caste marked by his Prophet with the brand of inferiority.

And, in so far as the influence of the Sheikh ul Islam, the ultimate judicial authority of the Empire, over his co-religionists in the Philippines is in question, she writes, speaking in general terms, that this influence is

great, and powerful for good or harm to the nation, according to his character, and the amount of justice and humanity he may display in his capacity of head of Islam and supreme judge. This influence, however, being strictly Mohammedan and based on religious dogmas, cannot be expected to carry with it that spirit of tolerance and liberality which a well-regulated government must possess in all branches of the administrative and executive power.

During the past year our forces in the Sulu archipelago were kept more or less actively occupied. And notwithstanding it was reported from Manila, during the early part of September, that the Legislative Council for the Moro province had been organized in accordance with the bill enacted by the Philippine commission for the government of the Moros, and that, in consequence, the province would now be within the jurisdiction of the Philippine courts and constabulary, it appears that General Leonard Wood reported a "feeling of unrest among the native inhabitants of Moro province," that upon his request an additional battery had been dispatched from Manila to strengthen the forces under his command; that there had been fighting in the province of Cavité; and that the insurgent Moros had "taken up a strong position in the mountains which flank Laguna de Bay."

When it is remembered that just about that time our war vessels were sent to Beirut, in order to protect our officials and other

¹ Twenty years in Turkey, p. 67.

American residents from the after-effects of an assassination which had not taken place; that the Turkish government has since protested against their presence; and that news travels fast and far in Eastern countries; it may not be mere surmise that there is a close connection between this circumstance and the reported "feeling of unrest" among the Moros. In any case it is probable that until the Near Eastern question is settled — and possibly even after it has been settled — there will be, as it were, seismic disturbances and upheavals among our Mohammedan subjects, concurrent in point of time with seasons of "friction" and "strained relations" between the United States and the Porte. It is clear that our motto in dealing with the Turk might with advantage be "*gant de soie, main de fer*"; that the silk glove should be of the finest quality; and that, as a first move in the right direction, we should raise our legation to the rank of an embassy.

EDMUND ARTHUR DODGE.

NEW YORK.